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Abstract 
We examine the costs of the public trust doctrine in environmental and natural resource 
protection and conservation. We provide a model of  litigation and settlement among 
disputing parties where the doctrine is applied. The model suggests that use of the public 
trust doctrine is likely to introduce more costs and be more time consuming than would 
alternative approaches, such as the purchase of private rights through market transactions 
or application of eminent domain powers. Because the doctrine  allows for 
uncompensated redistribution  it  is resisted by current resource owners. Further, by 
providing open standing to members of the “public” to challenge existing uses, public 
trust disputes encourage excessive demands and are more likely to go to trial than to be 
settled. This outcome is exacerbated if the plaintiffs are “zealots” and provide litigation 
services at below market cost, leading to greater investment in litigation. We present a 
case study of Mono Lake, part of the well-known 1983 litigation, National Audubon v. 
Superior Court to illustrate our arguments.  We suggest that the costs of the public trust 







In 1970, at the time of the rise of the modern environmental movement, Professor 
Joseph Sax argued that the public trust doctrine could be employed as a powerful tool for 
“effective judicial intervention” on behalf of environmental protection and natural 
resource conservation.
1 The article energized legal scholars to outline new applications of 
the doctrine and environmental advocates to petition for judicial intervention in the name 
of the public trust.
2   
                                                  
1  Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. 
REV. 471 (1970). 
2 Examples of the enthusiastic application of the doctrine include Slade, et al, Putting the Public Trust 
Doctrine to Work: The Application of the Public Trust Doctrine to the Management of Lands, Waters and 
Living Resources of the Coastal States (1990); Meyers, "Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust 
Doctrine to Include Protection of Wildlife" Issues in Legal Scholarship, Joseph Sax and the Public Trust 
(2003): Article 7. http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss4/art7; Robert Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge 
System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 Ecology L. Q. 457, 581-82 (2002); Kristen 
Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 
52 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1120 (2005); Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: 
An Emerging Doctrine in Search of a Theory, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 393 (1991); Michael Blumm, Public 
Property and the Democratization of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19   2 
As a legal principle, the public trust doctrine historically had applied narrowly to 
the right of the public to access navigable waterways without being impeded by private 
riparian owners. Although there had been controversial, limited extension of the doctrine 
in the 19
th century to public ownership of some tidelands and subsurface lakebeds, the 
notion that the public had superior rights to non-navigable waters, wildlife and other 
natural resources that were held in trust by the state, as suggested by Professor Sax and 
others in the late 20th century, represented a profound expansion.3   
The most celebrated incorporation of the public trust doctrine came in 1983 when 
the California Supreme Court in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 685 P.2d 
709 stated that the “core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign to 
exercise a continuous supervision and control over” the waters of the state to protect 
ecological and recreational values.
4 This ruling had the potential to greatly enlarge the 
coverage of the doctrine and the role of the police power of the state in regulating 
allocation and use of water and potentially, other natural resources. As a result of the 
ruling, the public trust doctrine was seen as a new mechanism that could be applied by 
the judicial system to force water users and the state (legislature and administrative 
agencies) to directly consider the values of alternative, often neglected water demands in 
allocating access and use.  
                                                                                                                                                    
Envtl. L. 573 (1989);  Charles Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the 
Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 Envtl. Law 425 (1989). 
 
3 See James L. Huffman, A History of the Public Trust Doctrine: A Tilting at Modern Myths, Lewis and 
Clark School of Law, 2006 for summaries of modern public trust arguments and criticisms of their legal 
precedents . 
4 National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 685 P.2d. 712.  See also Blumm and Schwartz (1995) and  
Sax (1990, 270) for discussion of subsequent cases in California that expanded the public trust doctrine.  
See also Gray (1994, 262-69). For public trust application to wildlife, see Meyers (1989). 
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Because of its recent prominence, the public trust doctrine has received 
considerable attention from legal scholars, both advocates and critics.
5  Economists, 
however, have largely been absent in this debate, despite the implications of the public 
trust implications for property rights, markets, regulation, and the allocation and use of 
water and other natural resources.  
In this paper we analyze one aspect of the public trust doctrine--its costs in 
addressing disputes over competing resource (water) values. We argue that it is likely to 
be a costly and contentious vehicle for achieving public environmental benefits and 
resource conservation. To demonstrate, we present a model to show why litigation under 
the public trust doctrine is more apt to go to trial than to be settled privately. The data are 
not available to directly test the hypotheses regarding settlement versus trial. But more 
broadly, the model shows how emphasizing the “public” nature of certain natural 
resources increases the costs of resolving resource conflicts. Broad entry is invited for 
multiple constituents to assert trust claims and for administrative agencies to extend 
regulatory mandates. These plaintiffs (some with below market wages) invest in efforts to 
redirect the resource toward uses they value. At the same time, the property rights of 
incumbent owners as defendants are subordinated and subject to reallocation without 
compensation. Hence, rights holders strongly resist such efforts.  
We illustrate these points by examining the conflict over Los Angeles’ water 
rights to the Mono Basin, empirical case underlying the Audubon ruling, The dispute took 
nearly 20 years to resolve with multiple court cases and involvement by various 
                                                  
5 For instance, see Epstein, Error! Main Document Only.The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO 
JOURNAL 411 (1987). Blumm and Schwartz (1995), Fischman (2002), Kearney & Merrill, The Origins of 
the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 
799 (2004) Carpenter (2005), and Huffman (2006).  
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constituent groups and government units. In the end, Los Angeles lost its ability to divert 
Mono Basin water, which provided about 15 percent of the city’s total water supply, 
without compensation.
6  We conclude with brief discussion of other public trust cases, 
noting that the doctrine has been applied less than advocates had anticipated after 
Audubon. The costs associated with the doctrine are a likely reason.  We explore 
alternative mechanisms for the reallocation and management of key natural resources.  
 
II. An Overview of the Public Trust Doctrine. 
The public trust doctrine asserts that the “public” has the legal right to utilize 
certain resources, such as tidewaters or navigable rivers without restriction by private 
owners.
7 These resources are so inherently common in their nature that their permanent 
assignment to exclusive, private ownership is inappropriate.
8  To insure group values are 
respected, the rights of the public are vested in the state as trustee of the resource. As 
such, the state through its administrative agencies has a duty to administer, protect, 
manage, and conserve the resource. Existing private users have only usufruct rights that 
can be withdrawn whenever the state deems that they are inconsistent with the public 
trust.
9 Since there were no private property rights, there is no basis for taking challenges 
                                                  
6 Citation 
 
7 David H. Getches, Water Law in a Nut Shell, St. Paul, West Publishing Co. 217, 224-8, 1997.  See also, 
James L. Huffman, A History of the Public Trust Doctrine: Tilting at Modern Myths, Lewis and Clark 
College, School of Law, 2006. 
 
8 Common means common property as described by Ostrom (1990). 
 
9 Richard A. Simms, A Sketch of the Aimless Jurisprudence of Western Water Law, in Kathleen Marion 
Carr and James D. Crammond, eds., Water Law:  Trends, Policies, and Practice, Chicago: American Bar 
Association, 321, 1995.   5 
in such reallocations. Further, the legislature cannot alienate trust resources, which must 
remain with the state.
10  
As such, the public trust doctrine provides for a powerful regulatory and 
supervisory role for the state with regard to the resources that are covered. Accordingly, 
extension beyond navigable waterways to include other natural and environmental 
resources as envisioned by Professor Sax represents a potentially broad extension of the 
police powers of the state.11   
   Within this context, the Audubon ruling in 1983 set several precedents as noted in 
Blumm and Schwartz (2003).
12  First, it enlarged the geographic scope of the trust by 
ruling that the doctrine applied to water diversions of tributaries adjacent to navigable 
waterways. Second, the court ruled public trust values are transient and that as values 
changed, the state was obligated to reallocate the resource to be consistent with those 
changes. Third, use rights to trust resources, such as water, were non-vested, subject to 
reallocation without compensation if they were applied in a manner inconsistent with 
trust values. Fourth, the court identified a major administrative obligation for the 
judiciary and state agencies in overseeing water and other trust resources.  Finally, the 
court affirmed a previous decision that granted open standing to parties in public trust 
                                                  
10 Sax (1990, 264, 269), Michael C. Blumm and Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust 
in Western Water, 37 Arizona Law Review, 709-11, 1905. 
 
11 Huffman (2006, 73). He disputes the asserted linkage between this view of the public trust doctrine and 
Roman law or English common law.  See also, Kearney & Merrill, The Origins of the American Public 
Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHICAGO L. REV . 799 (2004) for 
arguments that proponents have the misread the American legal history. 
 
12 Blumm, Michael and Thea Schwartz. “Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water.” 
Issues in Legal Scholarship.  Joseph Sax and the Public Trust. Article 3. 2003. 
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cases.  In Marks v. Whitney the court “expressly held that any member of the general 
public has standing to raise a claim of harm to the public trust.”
13    
Although, the Audubon ruling emphasized the relevance of the public trust 
doctrine as an environmental and natural resource management tool, the case has been 
controversial because of its potential to undermine the existing property rights structure.
14 
Its costs in impeding dispute resolution over public and private values in natural and 
environmental resources, however, not been addressed directly. To illustrate them, we 
now turn to a model of litigation and settlement under the public trust doctrine.  
 
III. A Model of Litigation and Settlement under the Public Trust Doctrine. 
In this section we develop a more formal model of the incentives to settle or go to 
trial in public trust litigation.      
Trial 
  As discussed in the preceding section, the “publicness” of certain resources as 
proclaimed under the public trust doctrine provides for broad legal standing by multiple 
constituencies. That is, any member or agency of the public potentially can enter as 
plaintiff in challenging current natural and environmental resource use.  Let the number 
of potential plaintiffs be indexed by i where i = 1, …, n and let  pi T  be the subjective 
expected benefit to plaintiff i of bringing suit against a defendant.  This benefit will be a 
function of two factors:  First, it will be increasing as the probability of winning the 
lawsuit rises, where p denotes the plaintiff’s probability of success. Second, it will be 
                                                  
13 Marks v. Whitney, supra, 6 Cal. 3d 251, p. 261-62. 
 
14 See HuffmanError! Main Document Only., A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a 
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. LAW 527 (1989). 
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increasing as the expected size of the damages rises, where D represents the expected size 
of the damages.  Therefore,  i i pi D p T = .       
Among potential plaintiffs, the one with the maximum subjective expected benefit 
of bringing suit will challenge the defendant, where the relevant plaintiff’s subjective 
expected benefit is  pi i p T T max = ,  where i = 1, …, n.  There are three determinants of 
p T :  First,  p T  increases in the number of potential litigants, n.  Second,  p T  increases in 
effort invested by the plaintiff, where  p e  is the effort expended by the plaintiff. Hiring 
more qualified lawyers, soliciting expert witnesses, or engaging in more concentrated 
research, makes it more likely that the judge will side with the plaintiff and increase the 
expected size of the damages awarded. Third,  p T  declines with the effort expended by the 
defendant, where  d e  denotes the effort expended by the defendant.  Accordingly, it 
follows that: 
    ) , ( ) , ( max ) , , ( d pi i d pi i i d p p e e D e e p n e e T = ,                                       (1)    
where i = 1, …, n.  
  Similarly, the subjective expected loss of going to trial for the defendant,  d T .
  ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( d p d p d p d e e D e e p e e T = .
15             (2)   
The plaintiff can use two types of effort:  p w , those who work for market wages 
and z, those who work for below market wages. The latter are zealots or “true believers,” 
who derive utility from participating in the case.  The defendant, with less emotional or 
                                                  
15 With symmetric information about the trial outcomes, the expected benefit to the plaintiff of going to 
trial would equal the expected loss to the defendant of going to trail.  It is more flexible and realistic to 
relax the assumption of symmetric information and allow the expected benefits and losses to be subjective.  
Consequently, in general,  p T  will not equal  d T .   8 
popular appeal, however, can use only  p w .  As a result,  ) , ( z w e p p  and  ) ( d d w e , and the 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s labor costs are ) , ( z w c p tp  and  ) ( d td w c . 
The value to the plaintiff of trial,  tp V , is the benefit less the costs incurred or  
  ) , ( ) ), ( ), , ( ( z w c n w e z w e T V p tp d d p p p tp - =         (3) 
The defendant’s total expected loss,  td L , of going to trial will be the sum of the 
subjective expected loss and the costs of trail or 
16   
  ) ( )) ( ), , ( ( d td d d p p d td w c w e z w e T L + =         (4) 
  The net value of trial,  t V , which is the plaintiff’s expected value and the 
defendant’s total expected loss or  
  td tp t L V V - =  
      td d tp p c T c T - - - =      
        ). ( td tp d p c c T T + - - =             (5) 
  Settlement 
Let  p S  and  d S  denote the plaintiff’s subjective expected benefit and the 
defendant’s subjective expected loss from settlement.
17  Let  sp c  and  sd c  be the costs 
incurred by the plaintiff and defendant, respectively of reaching a private solution.   
                                                  
16 It is the sum because  td L  is the defendant’s total expected loss of trial. 
 
17 Ex ante, uncertainty exists as to what the final settled amount will be.  Thus in general, it is reasonable to 
assume that  p S  and  d S  are not equal With settlement,  p S  and  d S  are not a function of effort as in 
litigation because neither party is attempting to persuade an outside entity to empathize with their 
respective causes.  In settlement, the expectation is taken with respect to uncertainty over the bargaining 
outcome.  In litigation, the expectation is taken with respect to uncertainty over the third-party’s decision 
process.   9 
In the special case of the public trust doctrine, there are multiple potential 
litigants, so that any settlement reached by the defendant with one plaintiff may be 
thwarted by the entry of another plaintiff. Therefore, we can write  ) (n csd . 
  The net expected value of settlement to the plaintiff,  sp V , will be the subjective 
expected benefit of settlement minus settlement costs, or  
  sp p sp c S V - = .               (6) 
The net expected loss of settlement to the defendant,  sd V , will be the subjective expected 
loss of settlement plus settlement costs, or   
  ) (n c S V sd d sd + = .              (7)          
  The net value of settlement,  s V , the difference between the net expected value of 
settlement to the plaintiff and the net expected loss of settlement to the defendant is    
sd sp s V V V - =                 
          sd d sp p c S c S - - - =                  
          ) ( sd sp d p c c S S + - - = .18           (8) 
  Trial and Settlement Together 
  Because trial is more costly than settlement, in natural and environmental 
resource disputes we are concerned when trial will be observed. This will occur whenever 
the net value of trial,  t V , is greater than the net value of settlement,  s V , or comparing (5) 
and (8), when                 
  ) ( ) ( sd sp d p td tp d p c c S S c c T T + - - > + - -  
                                                  
18 If we assume that there is perfect information in settlement – perhaps an assumption that both parties 
know the degree of damage caused – then  p S  will equal  d S .  If this is the case, then equation (8) 
simplifies and  )) ( ( n c c V sd sp s + - = . 
   10 
  ) ( ) ( sd sp td tp d p d p c c c c S S T T + - + > - - - .19      (9) 
  Implications 
Several implications emerge from this discussion regarding the settlement of 
disputes under the public trust doctrine. First, because the doctrine requires no 
compensation to the defendant, the plaintiff will benefit more from going to trial. A 
higher  p T raises  tp V  and  t V .  In contrast, private negotiated settlements are not affected. 
Equation (9) shows that increasing  p T  while holding  p S  constant, raises the relative 
value of trial to the plaintiff, the net value of trial, and ultimately the likelihood of trial. 
  Second, trial is more likely to occur than settlement because the public trust 
doctrine allows open standing for numerous plaintiffs.  Equation (5) shows that  
  ) ( td tp d p t c c T T V + - - =  
  )) ( ) , ( ( )) ( ), , ( ( ) ), ( ), , ( ( d td p tp d d p p d d d p p p t w c z w c w e z w e T n w e z w e T V + - - = . 
As the number of potential litigants, n, increases, so does the relevant plaintiff’s subjected 
expected benefit of trial,  p T , and hence the value of trial,  t V .
 20 Further from equation 
(8), 
  )) ( ( n c c S S V sd sp d p s + - - = . 
                                                  
19 If we assume perfect information in settlement, then  p S  will equal  d S  and equation (9) will become 
) ( sd sp td tp d p c c c c T T + - + > - .  Furthermore, if we assume perfect information in both trial and 
settlement, then equation (9) simplifies to td tp sd sp c c c c + > + .  This implies that trail will occur if the total 
costs to trial are less than the total costs to settlement.  In most general models of litigation, it is assumed 
the costs of trial are greater than the cost of settlement.  Therefore, if perfect information exists, parties will 
always opt for settling the dispute instead of going to trial. 
 
20 Recall that  ) , ( ) , ( max ) , , ( d pi i d pi i i d p p e e D e e p n e e T =  where i = 1, …, n.  If we array litigants from 
lowest expected benefit to highest expected benefit, adding additional potential litigants to the current pool 
of litigants will increase the right hand side of the equation above.  This implies as n increases, so does the 
subjective expected benefit of the relevant plaintiff.    11 
Increasing n raises the costs of settlement for the defendant, implying that the value of 
settlement,  s V , is decreasing in the number of potential litigants.   
Third, trial is more likely when the plaintiff can invest in effort with lower-cost 
labor than can the defendant, as is often the case in resource and environmental disputes.  
Returning to equations (5) and (9), recall that (9) shows that when  t V  increases relative to 
s V , trial is more likely, and recall from (5) that 
  ) ( td tp d p t c c T T V + - - =  
  )) ( ) , ( ( )) ( ), , ( ( ) ), ( ), , ( ( d td p tp d d p p d d d p p p t w c z w c w e z w e T n w e z w e T V + - - = . 












































































.          (11) 
The key comparison is to see how equation (10) relates to equation (11).  If the marginal 
product of labor is the same for zealots and standard labor and is the same for the plaintiff 
and the defendant, the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (10) will be equal 

























 or that the value of trial rises when zealots are used for labor rather than 
standard labor.     12 
Fourth, when more below market labor is available and when there are more 
potential litigants, trial outcomes will be skewed more heavily in favor of the plaintiff, 
increasing the likelihood of trial.  Recall equation (1), which states that 
  ) , ( ) , ( max ) , , ( d pi i d pi i i d p p e e D e e p n e e T = . 
Expanding this equation yields,
 
)). ( ), , ( ( )) ( ), , ( ( max
) ), ( ), , ( (
d d i pi pi i d d i pi pi i i
d d p p p
w e z w e D w e z w e p
n w e z w e T =
    (12) 
Equation (1) shows that the subjective expected benefit to the relevant plaintiff of trial is 
the product of the probability the judge will side with the plaintiff and the expected size 
of the damages awarded.  Taking the derivative of the left hand side of equation (12) with 
















.              (13) 
The first partial derivative on the right hand side of equation (13) is strictly positive and 
the second derivative is strictly positive when the marginal product of labor is positive.  
This indicates that the subjective expected benefit of trial to the plaintiff is strictly 
increasing in the number of low-wage workers or zealots.  Further, by examining the 
right hand side of equation (12) the plaintiff is able to increase both the probability of 
winning and the expected size of the award with more low-cost effort, which is not 
available to the defendant.  Further, as indicated in (12) when that the number of potential 
litigants, n, increases, both the probability of winning the case and the expected damages 
rise for the plaintiff.   
  As outlined by the model, the public trust doctrine raises the costs of private 
settlement relative to trial in natural and environmental resource disputes. We cannot   13 
directly test the model’s implications back of a lack of data on settlement versus trial, but 
we can illustrate how the costs of dispute resolution are affected by examining the 
conflict over water for Mono Lake.  
  
IV. Property Rights to Mono Basin Water Prior to the Public Trust Ruling in 
Audubon. 
 
Because the public trust doctrine subordinates private property rights as part of 
asserting state regulatory mandates, it is important to understand the rights that existed as 
part of the 1983 Audubon case.  At issue were both water levels in Mono Lake and the 
water flow in four tributary streams, Rush, Lee Vining, Walker, and Parker Creeks. Due 
to the lack of outlet, Mono Lake is alkaline and hypersaline, but the brine shrimp, algae 
and alkali flies that live in or near the lake support bird life, particularly the California 
gulls. The tributaries provided habitat for trout.
21   
Los Angles acquired the water rights in the Mono Basin between 1930 and 1940 
to augment urban supplies.
22 At the time, water for urban consumption was viewed as the 
highest and best use of the water.
23 Owens Valley and the Mono Basin, just to the north, 
were very important urban water sources. By the 1970s these two areas supplied 80 
                                                  
21 Mark Twain famously visited the lake in the latter decades of the 1800’s and wrote about his time there.  
He sarcastically described the lake as “a solemn, silent, sailless sea – [a] lonely tenant of the loneliest spot 
on earth – …little graced with the picturesque.” Mark Twain, Roughing It, New York. Penguin Putnam, 
Inc. 266, 1872. 
 
22 For discussion, see Libecap (2007, Chapter 7…..). 
 
23 “The use of water for domestic purposes is the highest use of water.” Stats. 1921, ch. 329, § 1, p. 443 
now codified as Water Code § 1255.   14 
percent or more of Los Angeles’ water through the Los Angeles Aqueduct. As noted 
above, the Mono Basin alone accounted for about 15 percent of the city’s water.
24  
In the early 20
th century, semi-arid Los Angeles had few options for water to 
sustain its population growth. One was the Colorado River, whose water arrived in 1941 
after completion of Hoover Dam and the California Aqueduct. Another was the Owens 
Valley and Mono Basins, on the east side of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, 250-300 miles 
northeast of the city. There were several attractions to Owens Valley and Mono water. 
One was high quality. The water was so pure that it did not have to be further refined, as 
was the case with highly-mineralized Colorado River water. Further, the water could be 
secured by gravity flow so that no pumping was necessary, as was the case for Colorado 
River water. Indeed, Owens Valley and Mono Basin water generated electricity.  Early 
figures indicated that Mono water alone generated some 268,000,000 kilowatt hours per 
year as it poured through the Owens River Gorge whereas, by contrast pumping Colorado 
River water to Southern California required at least 186,000,000 kilowatt hours.25 The 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) became one of the largest 
electric utilities in the country based on Owens and Mono water flows.  
The LADWP completed the Los Angeles Aqueduct in 1913 to transport Owens 
Valley water.  Between 1905 and 1935 the agency acquired 95 percent of the land and 
water rights in Owens Valley to support the aqueduct.
26 But this was insufficient as urban 
                                                  
24 Jones and Stokes (1993, S-1); Dunning (1990, 20); Hart (1996, 56-8). Currently, due to various 
environmental requirements, including those cited in the Mono Lake ruling, the Aqueduct supplies only 
around 34 percent. Page 3-3 2005 Urban Water Management Plan, City of Los Angeles, DWP, 
http://www.ladwp.com/ladw p/cms/ladwp007157.pdf. For discussion of Owens Valley, see Libecap (2005). 
 
25 Libecap (2007, chapter 7, **). 
 
26 Ostrom (1953, 121-27). 
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demand increased. Accordingly, beginning in 1930, the LADWP acquired the water 
rights in the adjacent Mono Basin to the north in order to export more water. Adding 
Mono Basin water required extending the aqueduct by 105 miles, construction of a tunnel 
to connect the two drainages, building of diversion dams and storage reservoirs, and 
addition of more hydro-electric generation capacity. This fixed investment was non 
deployable, and its value depended upon secure property rights to water.
27  
The construction of dams and storage reservoirs raised property rights issues that 
were to return 40 years later in the public trust case. In 1935 the California Fish and 
Game Department approved a license for the LADWP to construct storage dams without 
fish ladders or water releases and to dry up some 16 miles of the Owens River where the 
water was diverted from its normal river bed. In 1936, however, this decision was 
reversed as the agency called for protection of fish habitat under California Fish and 
Game Code, Section 5937 that required owners of dams to discharge sufficient water to 
maintain fish stocks. The LADWP reached agreement with the Fish and Game 
Department in 1940 (the Hot Creek Agreement) to provide a fish hatchery to offset fish 
losses downstream.
28  
With this agreement and completion of the capital infrastructure, the LADWP 
applied for rights to appropriate water flows from the four tributary streams to Mono 
Lake and to divert them through the tunnel and down the Owens River to the aqueduct to 
Los Angeles. The rights were granted in 1940 by the California Division of Water 
Resources (later the State Water Rights Board and the State Water Resources Control 
                                                  
27 Libecap (2007, chapter 7) 
 
28Tape EJ00087, Miscellaneous File,  “Chronological Statement of Land, Construction and Organization 
Matters in the Owens Valley District” from 1896 to 1945 by E. A. Porter, LADWP Archives. 
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Board, SWRCB).29 Concerns were raised about impact of water diversions on Mono 
Lake, but were rejected by the agency.
30 The first regular flow of water from the Mono 
Basin to the Owens River drainage and to Los Angeles began in 1941.
31 Not all of the 
authorized water was taken by the city at that time, however. The limited downstream 
capacity of the aqueduct prevented full appropriation of the water until the second 
aqueduct was completed in 1970.  
Additional concerns about fish habitat in the upper Owens River rose in 1952 as 
water was being directed to new hydroelectric plants. More parts of the river became dry, 
and fishing groups lobbied for legislation to require delivery of enough water to sustain 
the fishery. In response, the California legislature enacted Fish and Game Code Section 
5946 in 1953, which stated that preliminary permits or final licenses for water diversion 
in Inyo and Mono Counties (Owens Valley and the Mono Basin) were conditional on 
water release according to Section 5937 for protection of fish environments.  
The Fish and Game Department applied the new code to Los Angeles’ diversion 
request for the hydroelectric sites, but the California Attorney General ruled that the 
city’s request would be governed instead by the earlier 1940 Hot Creek Agreement. 
Accordingly, in 1955 when the city applied for diversion licenses for Mono Basin water, 
                                                  
29 Hart (1996, 38-40). 
 
30 Division of Water Resources Decision 7053, 7055, 8042, & 8043, April 11, 1940, p. 26. 
 
31 Tape EJ00087, Bibliography File, February 1, 1945, “Chronological Statement of Some Facts Pertaining 
to Land, Construction, Water Supply and Organization Matters of the Department of Water and Power in 
the Owens Valley District from December 10, 1928 to February 1, 1945 including a General Statement of 
Facts from 1895 to December 9, 1928,” LADWP Archives. 
   17 
the Attorney General granted them the same immunity as the 1940 permits. This ruling 
was unchallenged for 30 years, but then it would be overturned.
32  
By the early 1960s it was becoming time to draw upon more of the city’s water in 
the Mono Basin. The Los Angeles Aqueduct was at full capacity and urban demand 
continued to grow as Los Angeles’ population reached 2,479,000 people in 1960. There 
also was increased anxiety over the status of the city’s claim to the water it had not used 
under its 1940 diversion permit.33 In 1956, the State Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) reported that Los Angeles was exporting only 320,000 acre feet of the 590,000 
acre feet annually available in the Owens Valley and Mono Basin. In 1959, the State 
Water Rights Board warned that Los Angeles could lose its rights to the water it was not 
appropriating (under the beneficial use doctrine), noting growing interest in the apparent 
surplus water.
34 Further, the legislative representatives of Inyo and Mono Counties 
sought studies of how the excess water might be used in the Owens Valley and Mono 
Basin.  
 In July 1963 construction began on the second aqueduct, and it was completed in 
1970.
35 To gain authorization for the export of more water from the Mono Basin, the 
LADWP applied to the State Water Resources Control Board for additional diversion 
licenses. In 1974 diversion licenses 10191 and 10192 were granted, allowing the city to 
divert up to 167,000 acre feet annually. While between 1940 and 1970 an average of 
                                                  
32 Hart (1996, 118). See also, Hundley (2001, 336-46) for discussion of the politics of the Mono Lake 
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33 Hart (1996, 56). 
 
34 Kahrl (1982, 405-6), Hart (1996, 56). 
 
35 http://wsoweb.ladwp.com/Aqueduct/historyoflaa/aqueductfacts.htm 
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57,067 acre feet had been exported, with the new aqueduct capacity, water exports 
jumped from about 21,000 acre feet in 1969 to close to 100,000 acre feet or more through 
1975. The peak was nearly 135,000 acre feet in 1974.
 36  
With larger interception of tributary flows, Rush, LeeVining, Parker, and Walker 
Creeks dried up below the diversion points and the level of Mono Lake began to decline 
about 1.6 feet a year.
37 Between 1941 and 1981 the lake’s level had fallen about 46 feet, 
with one-third of that decline occurring after 1970. The surface area of Mono Lake 
receded from 90 to 60 square miles, and its salinity increased from 50 grams per liter to 
90 grams per liter.
38 Figure 1 reports Mono Lake elevations from 1935-2006.
39  The pre-
diversion average elevation of the lake between 1850 and 1940 was 6,415 feet above sea 
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39 Data on the Mono Lake elevations are from the Mono Lake Committee.  Each yearly observation is 
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The resulting effects, first on the lake and then on stream fish habitats, brought 
growing opposition to the water diversions in the 1970s.  This was the beginning of the 
controversy over Los Angeles’ water rights in the Mono Basin and their eventual re-
allocation under the public trust doctrine. 
   
V. Conflict over Mono Basin Water, the Public Trust Doctrine, and Implications of 
the Model.  
 
A Chronology of Disputes over Water Rights in the Mono Basin 
Table 1 summarizes the progression of conflicts over Los Angeles’ water rights in 
the Mono Basin.   20 
Table 1 
Court Case, Agency  Year  Action 
State Water Rights Board  1940  LADWP granted permits to appropriate Mono 
water for the aqueduct. 
State Fish and Game Commission  1940  Hot Creek Agreement to satisfy Fish and Game 
Code Section 5937. 
State Fish and Game Commission  1953  Fish and Game Code Section 5946 holds 
preliminary permits or final licenses for water 
diversion in Inyo and Mono Counties conditional 
on a water release under Section 5937. 
  1970  Los Angeles completes the second aqueduct. 
California Legislature  1970  California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).  
State Water Resources Control 
Board (SWRCB) 
1974  LADWP receives permanent licenses 10191 and 
10192 to divert up to 167,000 a.f. annually from 
Mono.  
National Audubon Society v. 
Superior Court 33 Cal 3d 419 
1983  Appropriative water rights restricted by the public 
trust doctrine. 
Dahlgren v. Los Angeles (Mono 
County Superior Court No. 8092) 
1985  Public trust requires release of 19 cfs down Rush 
Creek to provide fish habitat. 
Mono Lake Committee v. Los 
Angeles  (Mono County Superior 
Court No. 8608) 
1987  Public trust requires release of 4-5 cfs down Lee 
Vining Creek. 
 
California Trout v. State Water 
Resources Control Board  (207 
Cal.App.3d 585, Cal Trout I 
1989  Los Angeles’ diversion licenses revoked and 
reissued to comply with Fish and Game Code 
Sections 5946 and 5937. 
The Matter of Mono Lake Water 
Rights Cases (El Dorado County 
Superior Court Coordinated 
Proceedings Nos. 2284, 2288) 
1989  Injunction halting export of all Mono water 
through March 30, 1990; water releases of 85 to 
100 cfs for Rush Creek and 60 cfs down Lee 
Vining Creek to stabilize the lake’s level.   
California Trout v.  Superior 
Court 218 Cal. App 3d 187, Cal 
Trout II 
1990  SWRCB directed to amend LADWP’s diversion 
licenses to restore streams to their 1940 status. 
State Water Resources Control 
Board 
1991  Order 91-04 amends diversion licenses in Owens 
Valley and Mono to comply with Fish and Game 
Code Sections 5946 and 5937.   
Environmental Protection Agency  1993  Mono Basin in Moderate Non Attainment of  
Federal PM-10 Standards. 
State Water Resources Control 
Board 
1994  Decision D-1631 amends diversion rights to set 
permanent stream flows to public trust values in 
Mono Lake at a level of 6,392 feet.  
 
As Mono Lake levels declined, the National Audubon Society, Friends of the 
Earth, the Sierra Club, and a new coalition of environmental activists, the Mono Lake 
Committee that had formed in 1978, brought suit in 1979 to curtail Los Angeles’ export 
of water under the public trust doctrine. Referring to Marks v. Whitney 6 Cal. 3d 251   21 
(1971) which held that the public trust doctrine applied not only to navigable waterways 
but to streams used for recreation, wildlife habitat, and ecological study, the plaintiffs 
charged that Mono Lake was being harmed and that the diversion was not a reasonable 
and beneficial use as required by the state’s appropriative water rights system. This 
public trust argument posed clear challenges to private water rights.
40   
After two years, this initial public trust challenge was rejected in November 1981 
by the Alpine County Superior Court. The court ruled that administrative remedies to the 
dispute had not been exhausted and that the public trust doctrine was subsumed in 
existing California water rights law which governed Los Angeles water rights.
41 The 
plaintiffs successfully appealed to the California Supreme Court. On February 17, 1983 
in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court 33 Cal 3d 419 the court held that exercise 
of appropriative water rights is subject to limitation by the state in order to protect public 
trust values, including those of wildlife habitat: “Thus, the public trust is more than an 
affirmation of state power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation 
of the duty of the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, 
marshlands and tidelands…”(33 Cal 3d 441). 
According to the court, public trust regulatory responsibilities applied ex post to 
existing water rights, and these rights were use rights only that could be reconsidered in 
light of changing perceptions of the trust. Water belonged to the people. The court 
charged the State Water Resources Control Board with monitoring water use and re-
                                                  
40Duane Georgeson, Chief Engineer of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, said “If you can overturn that kind of 
right (granted by the state) in order to protect environmental values, this could be used in varying forms 
against all water rights in California.”  Steve Hinderer, DWP director of public affairs, said “We see the 
Mono Lake suit as a threat not only to 20% of Los Angeles’ water supply but also to all water rights in 
California May 22, 1979 LA Times –  
 
41 Hart (1996, 98).   22 
allocating it in a manner consistent with the public trust: “Thus, the function of the Water 
Board has steadily evolved from the narrow role of deciding priorities between 
competing appropriators to the charge of comprehensive planning and allocation of 
waters.” (33 Cal 3d 444).  
Because the ruling not only signaled the mostly uncompensated loss of valuable 
water rights, but also the value of Los Angeles’ past fixed investments in the aqueducts, 
dams, reservoirs, and hydroelectric facilities, the LADWP filed a petition for certiorari 
with the United States Supreme Court on the basis that the California court 
misinterpreted the public trust doctrine and that the decision deprived Los Angeles of 
vested property rights without due process of law (a takings). The Department of 
Interior's Regional Solicitor for California supported the appeal, but it was denied, 
November 7, 1983.
42  
  In July 1983, the U.S. District Circuit Court in Sacramento ordered the LADWP 
to reduce its water diversions from the Mono Basin through August 1984 in order to 
release enough water to stabilize the lake’s level.43 In August 1984 the city’s diversions 
again resumed from most tributaries to Mono Lake. But the Department of Fish and 
Game along with another advocacy group, California Trout, argued that the city should 
maintain flows in Rush Creek, the Mono Basin’s largest stream. California Trout, joined 
with the National Audubon Society, the Mono Lake Committee, and others sued under 
the public trust doctrine.
44 On March 7, 1985 in Dahlgren v. Los Angeles  (Mono County 
                                                  
42Conway (1984, footnote 108). City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. National Audubon 
Society e al .No 83-300, 464 U.S. 977, November 7,1983. 
 
43 Hart (1996, 103). 
 
44 Hart (1996, 109-14). 
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Superior Court No. 8092), the so-called Rush Creek Case, the court issued a restraining 
order requiring a flow of 19 cfs to provide fish habitat as part of the public trust. Later in 
August 1985, the court extended the order while studies were conducted to determine the 
amount of water necessary to maintain fish habitat. These studies took six years to 
complete.
45  A similar court ruling in 1987 in Mono Lake Committee v. Los Angeles 
(Mono County Superior Court No. 8608), the so-called Lee Vining Creek Case, required 
the resumption of water flows of 4 to 5 cfs down Lee Vining Creek to protect public trust 
values.46 Also in August 1987 the National Academy of Sciences report, The Mono Basin 
Ecosystem: Effects of Changing Lake Level was released suggesting that a lake level of 
6,380 be maintained to protect the lake’s ecosystem. Another state-funded study called 
for a similar minimum level.
47  
More permanent revision of Los Angeles’ Mono water rights occurred in 
California Trout v. State Water Resources Control Board (207 Cal.App.3d 585) on 
January 26, 1989 (Cal Trout I) where the appeals court concluded that Los Angeles’ 1974 
diversion licenses should be revoked by the State Water Resources Control Board and 
reissued because they did not comply with Fish and Game Code, Section 5946 that 
required protection of fish habitat. The court overturned an earlier opinion by the 
Sacramento County Superior Court issued on July 30, 1984 that the city’s appropriative 
rights were immune from such a challenge due to the 1940 Hot Creek Agreement. The 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
45 Hart (1996, 115-17). 
 
46 See linkage of these cases to the public trust in Los Angeles Times, October 26, 1986,  “As Mono Lake 
Rises, Its Political Climate is Slowly Changing,” Robert Crabbe, pg. 1. 
 
47 The Future of Mono Lake, CORI, Community and Organization Research Institute (UCSB) as described 
by Hart (1996, 124-5). 
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appeals court held that since Los Angeles’ 1940 diversion permits had not been placed 
fully into beneficial use until 1974, they were subject to the requirements of Section 
5946.
48  
In August 22, 1989, In The Matter of Mono Lake Water Rights Cases (El Dorado 
County Superior Court Coordinated Proceedings Nos. 2284, 2288) the court issued an 
injunction halting export of all water from the Mono Basin through March 30, 1990 and 
releases of 85 to 100 cfs down Rush Creek and 60 cfs down Lee Vining Creek to stabilize 
the lake’s level at 6,377 feet above sea level.  
To provide some financial reimbursement to Los Angeles for the lost Mono 
water, the California Legislature passed AB444, the Environmental Water Act of 1989, 
on September 22, 1989 to allocate $60 million for alternative water sources. Funds would 
be granted, however, only upon joint application by the LADWP and the Mono Lake 
Committee, a requirement that gave equal footing to one of Los Angeles’ key competitors 
for its water.49 A draft environmental impact report to examine the effects of water export 
from the basin and to outline management options also was to be prepared by the State 
Water Resources Control Board. 
50  
On February 23, 1990 in California Trout v.  Superior Court 218 Cal. App 3d 187 
(Cal Trout II), the Third District Court of Appeal further directed that the SWRCB amend 
the LADWP’s 1974 diversion licenses to include the requirement that: “The licensee 
                                                  
48 Los Angles Times, June 23, 1988, April 27, 1989, “DWP Told to Cut Back Diversion of Mono Lake 
Water,” pg. 34; April 29, 1989, “Court’s Decision, Inyo County Objections Put LA Water in Jeopardy, 
Kevin Roderick, pg. 1” 
 
49 Hart (1996, 132). 
 
50 Los Angeles Times July 16, 1989, “Bill to Halt LA’s Use of Mono-Area Water Shelved,” Virginia Ellis, 
pg. 3; August 11, 1989, “LA Backs Legislative Plan to Cut Use of Mono Water,” Virginia Ellis, pg. 1; 
August 17, 1989, “MWD May Back Bill on Mono Lake Water Dispute, Virginia Ellis, pg. 1;” September 1, 
1989, “Agreement Near on Bill to Cut Mono Diversions,” Virginia Ellis, pg. 32.   25 
shall release sufficient water into the streams from its dams to reestablish and maintain 
the fisheries which existed in them prior to its diversion of water.” This ruling mandated 
that Rush, Lee Vining, Parker and Walker Creeks be restored to their 1940 status. Some 
60,000 acre feet per year were to be released to the streams and Mono Lake.
 51  A 
Restoration Technical Committee with one seat each for the LADWP, the Mono Lake 
Committee, the National Audubon Society, California Trout, and the Department of Fish 
and Game was to manage the restoration of aquatic and riparian habitats. The LADWP 
was to pay for the restoration.52  
Disputes among these groups over the appropriate lake level target, the amount of 
water diversions to be allowed, and the extent of habitat restoration, however, brought 
another round of litigation. On April 17, 1991, the El Dorado County Superior Court 
ordered that the lake level be held at 6,377 and required that the LADWP pay court costs.  
There still was no agreement between the LADWP and the Mono Lake 
Committee on the allocation of the funds set aside by the state under AB444.  In 
September 1992 the U.S. Congress passed HR 429, the Reclamation Projects 
Authorization and Adjustment Act, authorizing the Bureau of Reclamation to pay one-
fourth of the cost of some water recycling projects, conservation, and effluent recycling 
in Southern California as partial offset for lost Mono water.
53  
Further pressure was added to the LADWP to give up more Mono water when the 
Environmental Protection Agency ruled on July 7, 1993 that the Mono Basin was in 
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52 Mono Basin Clearinghouse, www.monobasinresearch.org/timelines/polchr.htm. 
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moderate non-attainment of Federal Clean Air Act standards due to blowing dust from 
the dry Mono Lake bed.
54 
The draft EIR presented a lake level benchmark of 6,390 feet that would end dust 
pollution and maintain its tufa formations. The Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control 
District, the State Department of Parks and Recreation, the State Lands Commission, and 
other agencies supported this benchmark or higher targets. Even so, the lake level 
necessary for sustaining wildlife habitats and for protecting fish stocks in the streams still 
was not fully known.  
On September 16, 1994, the SWRCB published the final Environmental Impact 
Report, which called for a target lake level of 6,390 feet. To achieve it, there could be no 
water diversions by the LADWP from the Mono Basin until the lake reached 6,377 feet; 
then 4,500 acre feet a year could be withdrawn until the lake was at 6,390 feet; after that 
16,000 acre feet could be exported until the lake was at 6,391; and at higher levels all 
water in excess of flows necessary to protect fish habitat could be diverted, for an average 
of 30,800 acre feet per year. This process would take about 20 years. These final exports 
would be about one-third the amount diverted by the city in the early 1970s.
55  
Finally, on September 28, 1994, the State Water Resources Control Board 
formally amended the LADWP’s Mono water rights through Decision D-1631. As 
ordered in 1983 in the Audubon case and in 1989 and 1990 in the Cal Trout I and Cal 
Trout II cases, the diversion licenses issued twenty years earlier were reduced to comply 
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with Fish and Game Code Sections 5937 and 5946 and to protect public trust values in 
Mono Lake. Only small diversions would be allowed until the lake level reached 6,392 
feet above sea level. 
The Costs of Dispute Settlement under the Public Trust Doctrine. 
Because so much was at stake in the reallocation of the water without 
compensation, both the LADWP and the various plaintiffs invested in efforts to advance 
their particular positions. In 1993, the agency predicted that the long-term costs of 
replacing Mono water could be $1 billion.56 This figure did not include the costs of 
stranded, non-deployable capital in water export and hydro-electric generation.
57  
The plaintiffs in the Mono disputes with Los Angeles often relied on the expertise 
of federal and state agencies. They also were assisted by sympathetic volunteers. Many 
were members of the Mono Lake Committee. William Kahrl described them as “a small 
group of birdwatchers and graduate students… activated by nothing more complex than 
their deep affection for a place few Californians will ever see.”58  In both 1981 and 1991, 
supporters of the Mono Lake Committee took bike treks from LADWP headquarters to 
Mono Lake. The filled water bottles with water from LADWP’s  reflecting pool and 
dumped them into Mono Lake.
59  Further, a major law firm, Morrison and Foerster, took 
the Mono case pro bono.  Massive amounts of information were assembled by both the 
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plaintiffs and the LADWP.  The transcripts of the state Water Board hearing alone were 
over 30,000 pages.
60  Yet, one round of agreements among conflicting parties did not 
provide protection against new plaintiff or regulatory claims and more extreme demands 
on the defendant.  
  Table 2 summarizes the Mono Lake level demands of the various parties over 
time. Each higher level involved shifting water from urban consumption to the lake.  In 
general, there is a progressive rise in water level demands. The original objective of the 
initial plaintiffs, the Mono Lake Committee, in 1977 was 6,378 feet. This was 27 feet 
lower than the highest level sought by the most aggressive claim (California Department 
of Fish and Game) and 14.6 feet lower than what was finally set by the State Water 
Resources Control Board in 1994 after being empowered by the public trust ruling of 
1983.   
Table 2 
Year  Organization  Preferred Lake Level  
(feet above sea level) 
1977  Mono Lake Committee  6,378 
1979  Inter-Agency Task Force  6,388 
1979  Mono Lake Committee  6,388 
1988  Community and Organization Institute  6,382 
1988  US Forest Service  6,377 – 6,390 
1993  US Fish and Wildlife Service  6,390 
1993  State Lands Commission  6,390 
1993  Department of Parks and Recreation  6,390 
1993  US Forest Service  6,390 
1993  Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District  6,392 
1993  CA Department of Fish and Game  6,405 
1993  Mono Lake Committee  6,390 – 6,405 
1994  State Water Resources Control Board Final Decision  6,392.6 
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In March 1983, just after the initial public trust ruling, Sanford Wohlgemuth, 
Conservation Chairman of the Los Angeles Audubon Society wrote to the Los Angeles 
Times, 
“The DWP is saying that, in order to fill Mono Lake to 10% above its present 
level, all water from the area will have to be cut off for 15 years.  No one is asking for 
that.  We all realize the necessity of maintaining this water source for the city.  We are 
simply asking for a fair share of the water to save the lake and eventually restore its 
former health.  By reducing diversions by, say, 20%, Los Angeles will have its water and 
Mono Lake will begin to resume its original size and beauty.”
61 
 
Even as late as November 1984, David Gaines, head of the Mono Lake 
Committee state that “We’re not advocating a cutoff of Mono Basin water to Los Angeles.  And 
we’re not interested in returning Mono Lake to its pristine state.  We just want more water for the 
lake in wet years, when water for LA is available elsewhere.”
62But these demands would soon 
be expanded by other parties and additional issues, especially the application of the 
public trust doctrine to the tributary trout streams in Cal Trout I and Cal Trout II. In these 
cases, new plaintiffs, California fishing groups were joined by Mono Lake Commission 
in seeking additional constraints on Los Angeles.
63 
The two rulings ultimately required that all diversions by Los Angeles be halted 
in order to protect fish stocks.
64  There were more options in negotiating levels of Mono 
Lake than there were in setting minimum flows in the streams because of the small 
amounts of water in each one and the vulnerability of the trout changes in levels and 
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water temperatures.  Minimum flows were set by the courts in these cases.65  Indeed, 
once successful in forcing a rewatering of Rush Creek, the plaintiffs turned to the other 
streams until the export of water was no longer possible.  In 1986, the LADWP estimated 
that it cost $350 to maintain each fish in Rush Creek for one year.
66  
Moreover, once the public trust doctrine was introduced as governing the lake’s 
resources, multiple regulatory units intervened. Issues associated with the decline in 
Mono Lake’s level and the drying of tributary streams would have attracted the interests 
of state and federal agencies in any event, but the broad sweep of the public trust 
doctrine, the various court rulings, and the corresponding narrowing of existing private 
water rights widened the scope for regulatory entry.  
For example, in 1979, the Inter-Agency Task Force, involving the California State 
Department of Water Resources, the State Department of Fish and Game, the U.S. Forest 
Service, the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, and 
Mono County, along with the LADWP, researched options for the lake and Los Angeles’ 
ability to exercise its water rights. As shown in Table 2, these bodies became more 
involved over time, and additional agencies entered, including the U.S. EPA, California 
State Water Resources Control Board, Great Basin Unified Air Pollution Control District, 
and the National Research Council.
67  Further, in September 1984, the Mono Basin 
National Forest Scenic Area was created emphasizing the common use of federal lands 
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around Mono Lake.68 This designation, in turn, required broader regulatory controls on 
water exports as emphasized by Inyo National Forest Supervisor Dennis W. Martin: “We 
have the option, and probably the responsibility, to identify a lake level that would best 
meet the overall management objectives of the Scenic Area.”
69 In its subsequent report, 
the Forest Service was joined by the California Department of Fish and Game.
70 A 75 
percent reduction in Los Angeles’ diversions was recommended in a draft management 
plan.71  In 1990, the State Lands Commission agreed to file a friend-of-the-court brief 
supporting Audubon and the Mono Lake Committee to halt all diversions by Los 
Angeles.
72 In 1993, the California Department of Fish and Game, under even more 
pressure to reallocate water from urban use to restore stream levels under Cal Trout I and 
Cal Trout II, adopted the highest lake level target of 6,405 feet above sea level. In 
September 1994, the State Water Resources Control Board voted to set the Mono Lake 
level at 6,392-feet, effectively halting Los Angeles’ diversions.  Once the lake reached 
that level, in about 20-years, the city could then only divert an average of 30,800 acre-
feet, about 1/3 of its previous water right.73   
    
VI. Concluding Remarks. 
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In 1970, Professor Joseph Sax argued that the public trust doctrine could be used 
to re-allocate resources on behalf of environmental protection and natural resource 
conservation.  A test case for his arguments arose with the filing of National Audubon 
Society v. Superior Court 685 P.2d 709 in 1979 in an effort to limit Los Angeles’ export 
of water from Mono Lake. As described above, however, this public trust case was 
extremely contentious and costly to resolve.  The controversy over the case and the costs 
associated with it may have limited the application of the public trust beyond what had 
been envisioned by its promoters following the Audubon ruling in 1983.74  
Indeed, a Lexus/Nexus search of public trust litigation for the period 1985 
through 2004 reveals 32 court cases in 12 western states with three-fourths of them in 
California, Colorado, and Idaho. In general, the rulings have held that state 
responsibilities under the public trust doctrine may extend to maintenance of stream flow 
and water levels in rivers and natural lakes, including groundwater systems linked to 
them in order to guard for health, amenity values, and fish and wildlife habitat.75 Even so, 
range of the issues addressed by the courts seems to be quite narrow. It does not involve 
the broad sweep of possibilities for extending the doctrine to curtail private appropriative 
water rights, to manage wildlife, or to administer the federal lands as has been proposed.  
An alternative approach to address conflicting public and private values as 
occurred in the Mono Lake case that likely would be less costly and timelier is a market-
related response. In the case at hand, rather than rejecting Los Angeles’ water rights 
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under public trust claims, state and federal agencies might have purchased water to 
restore Mono Lake’s level to address public concerns. Where narrower private concerns 
were involved, as in the case of the individual stream fisheries, private groups, such as 
California Trout, could have secured water in a manner similar to that done by the 
Oregon and Montana Water Trusts.
76 Reliance in purchases would have had the 
advantages of producing more information about the relative values of water and reduced 
the conflict associated with uncompensated reallocations.  Extreme demands encouraged 
by open standing under the public trust would have been tempered by the requirement to 
purchase. Where no voluntary agreements on water transfers for public environmental or 
recreational uses were forthcoming due to bi-lateral monopoly conditions, eminent 
domain with compensation would have been an option for government acquisition of 
water.
77 All in all, the public trust doctrine appears not to be an attractive vehicle to 
advance environmental and natural resource objectives. 
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